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Beginnings
Learning the Names

The emotions are excellent examples of the fictional
causes to which we commonly attribute behavior.
          —B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*

The first day of class. It is the end of August, still very
warm in the Pacific Northwest. Here on our rural, residen-
tial campus, most freshmen are really fresh—eighteen years
old, away from home for the first time, excited, scared. I'm a
little excited myself. The task ahead of me—beginning again,
introducing myself in front of 25 pairs of eyes—always re-
sults in some measure of performance anxiety. (How many
teachers have the same dream I do the night before classes
start? I arrive at the class a few minutes late to discover that
I have the wrong room, or the wrong book, or no handouts,
or no clothes.) When I walk into the room, I pick up a little
of the electricity in the air; it crackles from the students to
me and back again. The choir directors of my youth used to
say we should be keyed up rather than nervous, so as to per-
form at peak. Channel that energy, they would say—make
your butterflies fly in formation. I smile at a student, who
responds shyly with her own smile. I begin to feel calmer.
    My job on this first day is twofold: to start to learn who
these writers are and—in spite of all the necessary official
handouts listing requirements and admonishing them about
plagiarism and responsible library use—to also reassure them

about the nature of the class, to create a positive and supportive atmosphere. Whatever I say, my subtext is always this: "It's OK, you can do this. You are all writers, and I am here to help you understand and use the strengths you already have." I begin by introducing myself, mentioning that I have kids their age—a fact that I hope makes me seem less threatening, more approachable. I want students to feel safe enough to take risks with their writing. I call roll, and we do an icebreaker in which they interview and then introduce a class member to the rest of us. We all begin to learn the names.

Melanie. She's the older woman in the back, her worn polyester blouse and slacks a contrast to all the casually expensive junior sportswear around her. The person introducing her mentions that Melanie also has college-age kids; I find out later that she is a high school dropout who recently passed the GED exam without studying. Heather. Her T-shirt proclaims her a member of Youth for Christ; she has the fresh-faced look of rural America. Tom and Chad. They are wearing identical fraternity polos and sit staring off into space with studied disinterest; even though I had asked people to interview someone they didn't know, they interview each other, introducing themselves in tandem as "totally cool." Alberto. A transplant from southern California, he volunteers proudly that he attended a well-known parochial prep school on a scholarship for Chicano students. Leontina. She is so soft-spoken we can hardly hear her; she wears a baseball cap with an X on the front over beautifully elaborate cornrows. Alice. She says earnestly and publicly that she is very anxious to add my class (I find out later it is so that she can take the course with her friend Jane, who sits next to her). Ed. His large, muscular frame makes him look much older than the average lanky freshman; we find out that he has just been discharged from the military and is celebrating by growing a beard. An Mei. A native of Hong Kong, she has come here to study pharmacy. All her friends placed in the ESL sections, and she expresses some surprise at being in a "real" composition class. Ira. His baby face and

halo of blonde hair make him look much younger than his classmates; we find out that he lives with his grandmother and that he has "never been good at English." Rod. Just off the family dairy farm, he is here on an academic scholarship. He has a passion for fly-fishing. Will. He looks a bit disheveled; we discover that he reads a lot of Hemingway and wants to be a writer. Jaymie. She wears a lot of makeup and a shirt identifying her with a sorority known for its memorable parties. She demonstrates a quick wit, immediately challenging any stereotype we might hold about sorority women.

I move on to a discussion of the general outline for the semester ahead. Freshman composition at this institution requires academic writing assignments based on multicultural readings. The writing tasks are demanding intellectually—students are often asked to read and think about emotional, value-laden issues and then write in the discourse of the academy, that is, in an analytical, objective fashion. The course also involves portfolio assessment, based on the system established by Elbow and Belanoff at SUNY Stony Brook, whereby another teacher will read my students' papers and decide on whether or not they will pass the course. Those of us in this room are a diverse lot; I know that the provocative texts we read will evoke complex affective reactions from the students as well as for me, and that the task of preparing a portfolio for an unknown reader will arouse anxiety among many. I wonder what the next few months hold for us all. The first writing assignment has to do with encountering the "other": a personal narrative and analysis of a moment of cultural encounter, a fitting metaphor for the experience we are initiating together today. I assign the readings: Edward Hall's "Anthropology of Manners," Simone de Beauvoir's "Woman as Other," Es'kia Mphahlele's short story "The Master of Doornvlei," Paul Laurence Dunbar's poem "We Wear the Mask."[1]

I ask them to do a freewrite on an encounter they have had with someone different, or with different manners or

customs. Toward the end of the class period, Ira tells me in a rather querulous tone that I have assigned too much to read. Feeling slightly irritated, I promise to help explain things and ask him to stay for a minute after class, but he strolls out with Tom and Chad. My irritation turns to annoyance; I don't like his attitude, and it's only the first day. Two other students linger to voice their anxieties about the class. Rod tells me that he needs to maintain a 3.0 GPA to retain his scholarship, seeming concerned already that he won't be able to make the grade. I assure him that while I can't predict or promise grades, if he works hard I will work with him just as hard. An Mei is worried—did she do the in-class assignment correctly? I tell her that all freewrites are "correct" and talk a bit more about the purpose of the exercise. She seems satisfied (but she will continue to check with me about her progress every day after class for the next few weeks). I leave the classroom, mentally reviewing names and faces for next time.

I work at learning student names quickly so that I can begin to mentally organize helpful information as I learn more about each of them as writers. Through the coming semester we will hit various affective bumps together. The chapters of this book will discuss our semester, first describing classroom encounters familiar to teachers of composition and then presenting the research that has helped me and I hope will help other teachers understand the nature of these encounters. In order to discuss the affective domain precisely, however, we need more naming, more introductions, this time to the terms that will be used in this book. But first, some background about why writing teachers need to think about affective issues and why it is so difficult for us to do so.

Coming to Terms with Affect

It should not be difficult for writing teachers and researchers to discuss affect (that is, the noncognitive aspects

of human behavior, especially the emotions). We are accustomed to viewing humans as both thinking and feeling individuals; the dichotomy of head and heart is so ingrained in Western thought that it seems natural to think of one when thinking of the other. Yet it has always been difficult to discuss affective issues in a systematic way, primarily because of the Western cultural bias against affect as a serious topic of academic interest.

As one psychologist points out, the Western attitude toward emotion is inherited from the Greeks, who saw cognition and affect as opposed to one another. Cognition was rational, affect was irrational (Lazarus 252); rational was good, irrational usually was not. Our culture views emotion as getting in the way of reason, interfering with proper (reasonable) action. "Cognition is sober inspection; it is the scientist's calm apprehension of fact after fact in his relentless pursuit of Truth. Emotion, on the other hand, is commotion—an unruly inner turbulence fatal to such pursuit but finding its own constructive outlets in aesthetic experience and moral or religious commitment" (Scheffler 347). The words and phrases we use to describe emotional states (lovesick, hotheaded, grief-stricken) indicate that our culture sees affect as something that happens to us, rather like a viral invasion, an affliction for which we are not responsible and cannot control. The affective realm has also long been identified in Western culture with the feminine, weak side of human nature. In the famous scene where Melville's Captain Vere announces his decision to hang Billy Budd, for example, he has this to say:

> [T]he exceptional in the matter moves the hearts within
> you. Even so too is mine moved. But let not warm hearts
> betray heads that should be cool. Ashore in a criminal case,
> will an upright judge allow himself off the bench to be
> waylaid by some tender kinswoman of the accused seeking
> to touch him with her tender plea? Well the heart here,

sometimes the feminine in man, is as that piteous woman, and hard though it be, she must here be ruled out. (111)

When the study of human behavior became systematized in the field we now call psychology, scientists took much the same view as Captain Vere. Freud, although attributing a good deal of behavior to the power of passion, viewed emotions as potentially harmful forces to be acknowledged and properly tamed. As behavioral psychology became more dominant in the discipline, affect was discounted as trivial. One behaviorist argued that the concept of emotion was useless, since the features of behavior that emotion supposedly explained were features of all behavior (Duffy 292). Others rejected emotion as a concept suitable for study because it was not substantive enough (Brown and Farber 466), that is, it was "fictional" (according to Skinner) in terms of explaining behavior scientifically. More recently, the cognitive perspective has gained ascendancy in psychology; cognitivists view humans as problem-solvers whose minds operate rather like computers in their processing, storing, and retrieving of information. But since computers do not feel, it was at first difficult for those who use an information-processing model of the mind to decide where affect should go in that model. It was easiest to ignore the emotions, or to view affect simply as "a regrettable flaw in an otherwise perfect cognitive machine" (Scherer 293).

But of course every time we walk into a classroom on the first day, we are newly aware of the affective realm. We cannot ignore it, nor should we consider it in isolation from the cognitive domain as we think about the psychology of writing. As Vygotsky said, the separation of affect from cognition

is a major weakness of traditional psychology, since it makes the thought process appear as an autonomous flow

of "thoughts thinking themselves," segregated from the fullness of life, from the personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses, of the thinker. Such segregated thought must be viewed either as a meaningless epiphenomenon incapable of changing anything in the life or conduct of a person or else as some kind of primeval force exerting an influence on personal life in an inexplicable, mysterious way. The door is closed on the issue of the causation and origin of our thoughts, since deterministic analysis would require clarification of the motive forces that direct thought into this or that channel. By the same token, the old approach precludes any fruitful study of the reverse process, the influence of thought on affect and volition. (10)

We need to come to terms with affect, viewing the affect/cognition split not as a dichotomy but as a dialectic.

In order to discuss affective issues carefully, we need a shared vocabulary with which to discuss affect—we need to learn the names for the affective states we encounter, both in ourselves and in our students. Because of the personal, subjective nature of the domain, the noncognitive aspects of human activity have been notoriously difficult for the scientific community to define (see Verplanck); aside from general agreement that there is a domain we may label "affective," there is not much agreement on how to describe it further. As one psychologist observes, the word "affect" has been used by psychologists to include a wide range of concepts and phenomena, including feelings, emotions, moods, motivation, and certain drives and instincts. "Theorists and researchers have approached affect in numerous ways, often using idiosyncratic, contradictory or mutually exclusive conceptualizations and operational definitions that have resulted in confusing and limited progress in our understanding of affect or any . . . related or synonymous constructs" (Corsini 32). Indeed, at the 1981 Carnegie Symposium on Cognition, the subject of which was "Affect

and Cognition," Herbert Simon, a founder of the field we now call cognitive science, called attention to the difficulty of discussing a concept that seemed to have a number of different meanings for those presenting papers at the meeting:

> I have some impression, in moving from one paper to the next, that we are indeed the traditional blind men, now touching one part of the elephant, now another. Affect is a word of everyday language that is subject to the imprecision of all such words—perhaps to more imprecision than most. Its various meanings are connected—that's how they arose in the first place—but not synonymous. (334)

Here I will introduce more names, this time names for affective states, in an attempt to clarify the meanings of various terms most commonly used by psychologists to describe affective phenomena. These names, along with the names of students, will recur throughout the book as we progress through a semester in a composition class. After the umbrella term "affect," the terms defined below move along a continuum of sorts from those that have the least cognitive involvement (emotion, feeling, mood) to those that have the most (motivation, intuition).[2] I have kept as much as possible the ordinary use of these terms, intending not to give new stipulative definitions of familiar terms but to suggest more precise, focused meanings for them. It should be understood that the concepts being defined are in fact hypothetical constructs—none of us has seen an emotion or an attitude, only responses that lead us to believe that such things exist. The definitions are intended to be descriptive so that their precise meaning as they are used in subsequent chapters will be clear. At various points I will also mention areas where we need to know more about the relationship of affect and writing, for those who might wish to explore those areas themselves.

Affect

The word "affect" embraces a wide variety of constructs and processes that do not fit neatly under the heading of "cognition." Besides the varied use by psychologists noted above, educators have employed the term to describe attitudes, beliefs, tastes, appreciations, and preferences. The best-known use of the term in this broad sense is the handbook by Krathwohl, Bloom, and Masia, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Affective Domain*. I am guided by Simon (335) and by Clore, Ortony, and Foss to suggest that we use "affect" as a generic term to describe such phenomena as emotions, attitudes, beliefs, moods, and conation (motivation); I also include one phenomenon not listed by these psychologists, intuition. Affect is therefore not a synonym for emotion; an emotion is an affective state, but not all affective states are emotions.

It is important to note that the cognition/affect dialectic should not be equated with rationality/irrationality, as it often is in common usage. "Cognition" as it is used by most psychologists refers to the processing of information and invoking of knowledge, both conscious and unconscious, deliberate and automatic; it does not mean only rational, thought-like processes (Lazarus 252–53). An affective state, on the other hand, can be a very rational (in the sense of appropriate and reasonable) response to a situation. It should also be noted that the affective phenomena described below all have some cognitive component; as Piaget noted, "[A]t no level, at no state, even in the adult, can we find a behavior or a state that is purely cognitive without affect nor a purely affective state without a cognitive element involved" (qtd. in Derry and Murphy 13).

Emotion

William James posed the scientific question "What is

an emotion?" in 1884, but there is still little agreement in the psychological community about the answer. Scientists have tried to identify and group various emotions, with contradictory results. Some researchers (Tomkins; Izard; Plutchik) subscribe to a "palette" theory of fundamental emotions that can be blended, rather like primary colors, to make up secondary emotions (contempt, for example, is made up of two primary emotions, surprise and disgust). Others have discredited such a theory (G. Mandler, *Mind* 34–37; Averill, "Constructivist" 326–29), pointing out that even those who believe in primary emotions cannot agree what those fundamental emotions are and that there is evidence of cultural variation among emotional systems that would contradict the idea of universal fundamental emotions (Harré 10–12). Another classification system, that of Ortony, Clore, and Collins, begins with the cognitive construals that determine emotional states. These researchers first define three broad classes of emotions that result from focusing on three aspects of the world: events and their consequences, agents and their actions, and objects. They then describe what they refer to as "emotion types" (15), discussing the eliciting conditions and influencing variables of emotions (for example, one can be pleased or displeased about the consequences of an event, approve or disapprove of the actions of an agent, like or dislike an object). For example, Ortony and his associates discuss anxiety as one of the "fear emotions"—that is, a reaction to the prospect of an undesirable event or outcome.

But whatever their particular stance on the number of and names for emotions, cognitive psychologists generally agree that emotions consist of a bodily activation (arousal of the autonomic nervous system involving a visceral reaction— increased heartbeat, a knot in the stomach, a heightened awareness of external stimuli) and a cognitive evaluation of that activation (see Kleinginna and Kleinginna, "Emotion Definitions"). Most also agree that these evaluations are valenced (for example, labeled as negative or positive) and that they range in intensity (some, like anger, are "hot"; some,

like hope, less so). There is growing interest in affect and the writing process, as evidenced by the work of such scholars as Lynn Bloom, Brand, Fleckenstein, Flower (*Construction*), Larson, McLeod, and Selfe.

The most studied emotion in writing research is anxiety, an affective state characterized by tension (both physical and mental), worry, and feelings of uneasiness about an undesirable event or outcome (see Ortony, Clore, and Collins 109–13). A useful distinction can be made between two forms of this affective phenomenon—trait anxiety and state anxiety (Spielberger). Trait anxiety is for some persons a habitual response to the vicissitudes of life; such persons are mildly anxious or fearful under all circumstances (like the student who writes well but frets over every assignment). State anxiety, on the other hand, is a more intense reaction to a particular circumstance. There are many studies of writing anxiety (see Smith; Rose, *Writer's Block*). However, these studies sometimes fail to differentiate between the two forms of anxiety, or between different forms of the phenomenon in the same students. Students who are anxious about writing for a grade are sometimes quite comfortable with writing for self-expression or writing letters (L. Bloom, "Composing Processes"; Perl, "Unskilled," "A Look") and therefore should be labeled as "anxious" or "high apprehensives" only in certain writing situations. Many such studies have also neglected the relationship between writing anxiety and other state anxiety situations; test anxiety, for example, would seem to be related to writing anxiety (especially in timed writing situations; see I. Sarason).

Less intense and more lingering, global affective states (such as contentment or dissatisfaction) may be thought of as moods. There are a number of studies that suggest a relationship between moods and information storage and retrieval—between mood and memory, as well as mood and learning (Bower; Bower and Cohen; Bastick; Kuiken; Morris). In other words, there is evidence that affect can direct and influence cognitive activities; there is, however, little research

on the connection between writers' moods and how those moods might facilitate or inhibit writing.

The term "feelings" is often used in ordinary parlance as synonymous to "emotions" and has been used in that sense by some who write about affect (McLeod, "Some Thoughts"; Stein and Levine). Such usage creates difficulties, however, since some feelings are emotions but others are not: one can feel hungry as well as angry. Since "feeling" usually refers to bodily sensation, it might be more accurate to use the noun "feelings" to refer to those sensations that are part of the affective experience—the sweaty palms, constricted breath, dry mouth, and other symptoms of arousal of the autonomic nervous system, as well as the more diffuse sensations of moods (for example, feelings of lassitude). The verb "to feel" would then describe the bodily sensations associated with an emotion or a mood. Feelings can be thought of as part of an emotional experience but not necessarily synonymous with that experience. Emotions will be discussed more fully in chapter 2; classroom encounters with Ed, Alice, Leontina, Tom, and Chad will help illuminate issues of emotion.

Motivation

While there is some question as to whether or not conative aspects of mental activity should be classified under affect or should be considered separately, it is clear that motivation has an affective component. Motivation (Alexander Bain called it "will") refers to the internal states that lead to "the instigation, persistence, energy, and direction of behavior" (Corsini 395), to setting goals and energizing goal-directed behavior characterized by "impulse, desire, volition, purposive striving" (English and English 104). Motivation can be physiological (thirst motivates me to find water) or psychological (anxiety about a deadline motivates me to finish my work; see Kleinginna and Kleinginna, "Motivation Definitions"). Researchers distinguish between two kinds of psychological motivation: extrinsic (in a classroom

setting, getting good grades, pleasing the teacher, working toward a career goal) or intrinsic (wanting to achieve success or avoid failure). There is evidence to suggest that while extrinsic motivation is important in learning situations, intrinsic motivation and self-direction are in fact more powerful (Deci, *Intrinsic*; Nicholls). More recently, psychologists have looked at motivation in the context of achievement motivation; an interesting branch of this research is attribution theory, an area that examines what people perceive as the cause for certain outcomes (as, for example, success or failure at academic tasks; see Weiner, *Attributional Theory*). The theory of learned helplessness, where students who feel they have no control over their success or failure simply give up at the first sign of difficulty (Diener and Dweck), is also of interest to writing teachers. This and other motivational theories will be discussed further in chapter 3, where the experiences of Alice, An Mei, Will, and Ira will illuminate these theories.

Beliefs and Attitudes

Beliefs have been defined as our judgments of the credibility of a concept or idea, "non-observable theoretical entities postulated to account for certain observable relations in human behavior" (Colby 253–54). Milton Rokeach, perhaps the best-known researcher on the subject, defines beliefs as "inferences made by an observer about underlying states of expectancy"—beliefs can be inferred from all the things the believer says or does (*Beliefs* 2). Rokeach defines values as central beliefs about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some state of existence that is worthwhile or not; values are abstract representations of positive or negative ideals of conduct or goals (124). Other researchers suggest that the value we place upon a task is a function of three components: the attainment value of the task, its intrinsic interest, and its utility value for our future goals (Eccles et al.); these values are culturally as well as individually deter-

mined. Beliefs about task value determine how people set achievement goals for themselves and are therefore an important part of the motivational process.

Although there are a number of general studies examining teacher beliefs about instruction (Nespor; Schoenfeld; Wehling and Charters), there has been little research on teacher and/or student beliefs about the nature and value of writing and the writing process since the 1984 study by Gere, Schuessler, and Abbott. Such research would seem promising, with important implications for preparing writing teachers at all levels. One recent study, for example, shows that 72 percent of the students in the total sample (247) believed that the most important purpose of writing is self-knowledge and self-expression. If a teacher believes the primary purpose of writing is persuasion, students and teacher will be working at cross-purposes (Palmquist and Young 161). Aside from the studies based on attitude questionnaires, research having to do with student beliefs about themselves as writers is also sparse (see Silva and Nichols). These beliefs are no doubt related to such psychological constructs as self-concept and attributions of success and failure as well as to the specific subject of writing. They would also seem to be related to cultural beliefs about writing and the societal value placed upon writing, issues that are of importance as we discuss theories of the social construction of knowledge in composition. And what about students' personal belief systems and how those interact with their writing? Writing teachers are all too familiar with the papers—often on religion but sometimes on other issues—that are impassioned sermons rather than reasoned arguments. How does a given student's belief system affect his or her ability to write about issues that either affirm or challenge that system?

Attitudes spring from beliefs. Social psychologist Gordon Allport, writing in 1935, defined attitude as "a mental or neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which

it is related" ("Attitudes" 810). In other words, attitudes are psychological entities acquired over a period of time as a result of experience; these attitudes influence us to act in certain ways and to respond to the world in a relatively consistent fashion. An attitude is not a response but a readiness to respond in particular ways. Allport's definition is still the standard one, with some recent modifications (see Rajecki). Those who write about attitudes often assume three components, based on a model put forward by Rosenberg and Hovland in 1960; these components are affect, behavior, and cognition. An affective reaction is usually part of an attitude, acting as an evaluative element (labeling the object of the attitude good or bad, positive or negative). Behavior is the intentional element, indicating what we do as a result of our attitudes. We might view attitudes as similar to emotions but less intense and more stable over time.

Most attitude theories emphasize individualistic, subjective phenomena; these theories neglect, however, the social aspect of acquiring and expressing attitudes. Richard Eiser points out that while attitudes may be private, the expression of attitude is a social act, and that attitude should be studied as a social product as well as a subjective experience. Eiser defines the term as "the meaning of a person's expressive behavior" (5), arguing that the relationship between attitudes and behavior is not necessarily a causal one (as is often assumed) but a logical one, based on social as well as personal factors. This view of attitudes being socially as well as privately constructed phenomena fits with the social constructionist view of knowledge. It also suggests that if our students' negative attitudes toward writing are the result of social as well as individual factors, then we need to think about how to establish in the writing classroom collaborative activities aimed not only at cognitive but also at attitudinal changes brought about by the group process. Chapter 4 provides a fuller discussion of beliefs, values, and attitudes; encounters with Alberto, Heather, and Jaymie during the semester illustrate this discussion.

Intuition

This term is used by psychologists to describe both the knowledge and understanding that come through nonrational means and the process by which that knowledge comes (Harré and Lamb). Related concepts are insight, that moment of illumination and intuitive comprehension, and inspiration, that feeling of tension and excitement that accompanies an insightful experience. These concepts have been associated over the centuries with religious as well as artistic and scientific problem-solving experiences. For the present discussion, however, I assume that intuition is a way of knowing but that it does not necessarily lead to truth (or to Truth). Intuition is the subject of chapter 5, where Rod's experience illustrates the phenomenon.

A Theoretical Framework for Discussing Affect

Besides terminology, we need a theoretical framework to inform our discussion of affect. Which of the several perspectives from which researchers have begun to examine affect is the most useful to writing teachers?[3] Let us briefly examine some of the major strands of research in the field. First of all, it is clear that there are certain biological factors involved in affective experiences; one strand of research examines the biology and chemistry of emotion, looking at physiological and neuroendocrinological phenomena. The biological research on affect asks such questions as "What exactly is the 'gut' reaction we feel during emotional experiences? How and where is the reaction processed and regulated by the brain? How do various biological factors (such as body metabolism) affect emotion?" The questions are answered by looking at data gathered by testing bodily reactions in the laboratory, using such instruments as the EEG (see, for example, Pribram; Davidson) or analysis of metabolic functions (Whybrow).

Another way of looking at affect is psychoevolutionary, harking back to Darwin's theory of emotions as common to both animals and humans. This strand of research examines the adaptational responses of animals for clues to human behavior (see Plutchik); one branch of this research looks at animal communication, discussing such matters as whether this communication is affective or cognitive (see Marler). While this strand of research does not appear immediately applicable to the writing process, it is helpful in underlining for us the fact that emotions are physiological as well as psychological phenomena.

Other researchers examine developmental aspects of the affective domain, asking such questions as "How early can humans be said to have affective reactions? How do emotional systems develop and what influences their development?" These researchers look particularly at infants' emotional states (for example, Emde) and at the role of affect and social interaction, especially communication (Trevarthen). Some assume that cognition and emotion are generated by different systems and examine how one system influences the other as children develop (Case, Hayward, Lewis, and Hurst). Writing researchers discuss students' intellectual development; clearly we need also to attend to their affective development as well.

There are anthropological approaches to the study of affect, approaches that ask questions about the cultural variability of affective responses, the conceptualization and naming of emotions in different cultures, and the cultural factors that contribute to affect (see Levy). These researchers often concentrate on facial expressions and what they signify in different cultures (see Ekman). There is also a strand of research that relies on questionnaires as instruments to determine the subject's affective response, especially anxiety, in various circumstances.[4] As we attend more and more to cultural difference in our university classrooms, in the curriculum and in the diversity of our students, cultural differences having to do with affect will be important for teachers to

understand.[5]

While all these perspectives on affect provide interesting information, there are two perspectives on affect that are of particular interest to writing teachers and researchers: that of the cognitive psychologist and that of the social constructionist. The former category is a rather large umbrella to shelter a somewhat disparate group of researchers, all of whose theories can be characterized by one shared idea, first put forward by Schachter and Singer: that the emotional experience is made up of an arousal of the nervous system and a valenced (positive or negative) cognitive appraisal of the bodily signals.[6] The theory of George Mandler stands out as the most useful for those of us in composition studies, since it fits the well-known cognitive-process model proposed by Flower and Hayes. The idea of the social construction of knowledge is viewed with growing interest in composition; Rom Harré and his associates have worked out a theory that examines affect as part of a social system. The next chapter enlarges upon these two theories, examining how emotion and cognition intertwine in the writing process.