Notes

Preface

The composition program at Washington State University has a one-credit writing tutorial attached to the introductory composition course for those students identified on the writing placement examination as needing extra help with their writing. The tutorial, consisting of five students and a tutor (like Susan Parker), meets once a week, during which time students work on the papers for their composition class.

1. Beginnings: Learning the Names

1. These and all other reading assignments mentioned in the book may be found in the second edition of *Writing about the World*, ed. Susan McLeod, John Jarvis, and Shelley Spear, NY: Harcourt, 1994.

2. See Fleckenstein for a slightly different continuum of affective phenomena.

3. Although the categories of research I discuss are somewhat different from theirs, I am indebted to Scherer and Ekman's discussion in their introduction to *Approaches to Emotion* for helping me conceptualize this part of the discussion. A broader classification of past research on affect is George Mandler's; in chapter 2 of *Mind and Body*, he discusses approaches to affect that are "organic" (emphasizing the body) and those that are "mental" (emphasizing the mind). For a discussion of pre-nineteenth- century views of emotion, see Brand, *Psychology* 39–41.

4. The Daly-Miller writing apprehension research is the most familiar application of this strand of research to composition studies (see Daly). For a critique of these differential approaches to the study of affective phenomena, see G. Mandler, "Helplessness" and "Comments."

5. See, for example, the research of Bersoff and Miller, which examines differences in subjects' judgments of moral accountability in two different cultural settings, the United States and India.

6. See Ortony, Clore, and Collins 6–8 for an excellent summary of this research perspective.

2. *Emotion*

1. I do not wish to ignore the fact that these two theories can imply two different epistemological bases. Such differences should not make it impossible for us to find both theories useful, any more than a knowledge of psychology should make it impossible for us to understand and make use of research in sociology and anthropology. I agree with McCarthy and Fishman's argument that "serious intellectual work requires a full repertoire of epistemological stances" (465). Further, despite their differences, both theories have one important element in common—the notion of construction, both individual and collective.

2. For the discussion of the development of modern psychological approaches, I am indebted to Gardner, chapter 2. The paradigm shifts in the psychological community parallel in some ways the theoretical and methodological shifts in the composition community; around the turn of the century we too were a proto-discipline; those who speculated about the writing process (often professional writers) usually wrote about it introspectively. Later, usually in departments of education, we borrowed the behaviorists' methods for comparison-group studies and analysis of the data generated by such studies. With the advent of cognitive science we turned to a problem-solving notion of the writing process, using the cognitive psychologists' protocol analysis of data and information-processing model of the mind. As we realize what this model leaves out, we too are examining context and affect as well as cognition.

3. It is not that Flower and Hayes were unaware of affective issues; in fact they mention motivation, self-confidence, and intuition in some of their earliest work (Hayes and Flower 12; Flower and Hayes, "Dynamics" 42). Flower discussed writing anxiety and how to cope with pressure in the second edition of her textbook (1985); her latest book, *The Construction of Negotiated Meaning*, includes in the chapter on metacognition a full discussion of affect.

4. In the early discussions of this concept, the preferred plural was "schemata"; here I follow the suggestion of Jean Mandler (*Stories* 2) and the practice of recent discussions in using the Anglicized plural.

5. Not all researchers are enamored of schema theory, however. Critiques of the theory are summarized in Fisk and Lindville.

6. There are, of course, differences in the composing processes according to the task set (see Seltzer; Durst; Marshall; Flower et al.). But interruption is common to all but the most routine and automatic writing tasks.

7. See Bever, who uses the same comparison to describe a theory of aesthetic experience.

8. As Petraglia points out, "social construction" is not a single theory but a rubric under which are gathered a number of theories about social knowledge. Here I have chosen to follow Bruffee's interpretation and application of this rubric ("Response").

9. See, however, Rorty's reaction to this characterization of his work in Gary Olson's interview for the *Journal of Advanced Compositon* and Bruffee's published "Response." See Berger and Luckmann's *Social Construction of Reality* for an earlier discussion of the sociology of knowledge.

10. I am indebted to Kathleen Burrage for this insight.

11. While there are several theorists mentioned in the following discussion, the theory of social construction to which they subscribe is a unified one; see Harré, "Outline."

12. "Inkshedding" is the term for a technique using in-class writing developed by James Reither (St. Thomas University, New Brunswick) and popularized by Susan Wyche-Smith and Connie Hale at the Wyoming Conference on English. It is a method of using in-class writing to gauge and share student response to what is happening in class. It has three characteristics: the writing is done quickly (in five minutes or so) in response to a lecture, discussion, film, etc.; the responses are anonymous unless a student chooses to sign; and the responses are published in some form (usually typed up and passed out the next day for discussion).

3. *Motivation and Writing*

1. Although it is clear that teachers are most concerned with psychological rather than with physiological motivation, it is im-

portant to remember that the latter is powerful enough to override the former. It is difficult, as we all know, to teach an early morning or late evening class full of tired students.

2. Recently Lepper and Hodell have presented a more cognitive interpretation of effects of reward systems on intrinsic motivation.

3. I am indebted to Dweck and Elliott's excellent review of achievement motivation for my understanding of this strand of research.

4. Task persistence is not always entirely positive, however; as Dweck and Goetz point out (177), it can result in what might be called the "Nixon syndrome"—unusually prolonged persistence designed to forestall admitting failure or facing up to one's limitations.

5. Note that Ira, who exhibits "learned helplessness" behavior in every other respect, attributes all his difficulties to outside factors and takes none of the responsibility himself.

6. Dweck notes that Alfred Binet, the inventor of the IQ test, was clearly an incremental theorist, believing that intelligence (capacity as well as skills) could be enhanced by his training program (Motivation" 103). See Binet 104.

7. Berglas and Jones have called this strategy "self-handicapping." The student uses strategies (like minimal effort or procrastination, as in Ira's case) that reduce the likelihood of success but also serve as a protection against a judgment of low ability.

8. See Stevens et al. for an interesting description of such a project that integrated reading and composition at the elementary level.

4. Beliefs and Attitudes

1. See Anderson's excellent essay on this subject.

2. It is not just right-wing groups that complain about books in the schools, of course; various complaints have also arisen from members of ethnic groups who object to negative stereotypes in fiction—*Huckleberry Finn* is a frequent target because of racist language, for example. But these incidents are scattered and few compared to the organized effort of the political and religious right. See "Censorship."

3. Two of the most populous states, Texas and California, have

a statewide adoption policy for school textbooks. These are states in which conservative groups have exerted considerable pressure to sanitize books in the public schools; if a publisher wants to make a profit on a textbook, that book must pass the "Texas test"—that is, have nothing that could possibly offend conservative constituencies. While the college textbook market is not affected by such pressures, our classes are not immune from attempts at censorship. The growing field of gay and lesbian studies has gotten the attention of the religious right; recently an evangelical minister in Montana succeeded in raising a public outcry over a proposed gay studies class. The teacher was pressured to cancel the class (Gonshak).

4. Kirkpatrick and other psychologists researching this phenomenon distinguish between orthodoxy and fundamentalism; the former involves the complete acceptance of well-defined religious tenets, while the latter involves, along with the belief content, an authoritarian mindset. Hence it is not the beliefs themselves but the authoritarian and dogmatic stance that characterizes fundamentalism of all stripes, right or left.

5. This is the rock on which the "politically correct" issue founders; those who accuse universities of promulgating politically correct ideas do not make the distinction between encouraging students to think for themselves and telling them what they ought to think. This is the problem I have with Hairston's position on diversity and ideology in the composition curriculum, although I suspect that she and I are closer in our actual classroom behavior than our stances might suggest. Her essay assumes that a curriculum that focuses on such issues is necessarily one in which the teacher uses the classroom as a platform from which to teach his or her own belief system and values rather than as a way to move students toward a more open system of beliefs.

5. *Intuition*

1. I do not include in this definition the phenomenon of precognition (knowing about something before it happens), which is sometimes conflated with intuition, as for example in the work of Bastick and of Goldberg. I also have not included a discussion of intuition as a supposed "left brain" phenomenon, since recent re-

search suggests such a conclusion is simplistic. See Goldberg's chapter "Right Brain, Wrong Theory" and Perkins 256–62.

2. For a more complete history of the development of intuition as a concept in ancient times, see Noddings and Shore, chapter 1. For a complete account of the concept of intuition in philosophy, see Wild.

3. See Jaynes's *Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* for a somewhat different perspective on the external representation of internal events in ancient cultures.

4. For my understanding of the relationships among the philosophies of intuition discussed in this section, I am indebted to both Westcott (*Toward*) and to Noddings and Shore.

5. Jung's theory leads to an interesting question: are there intuitive "types," or can we all learn to be intuitive? Goldberg's answer is that independent, confident, flexible people are those who are more likely to encourage and trust their intuition (109). I would add that because extensive knowledge, experience, and analysis are usually needed before intuitive knowing can take place, most of us are better intuiters in one knowledge domain than in another.

6. Poincaré referred to all intuitive mathematicians as "geometers" because they think visually and take visual evidence as intuitive proof. See *Foundations*.

7. What is known popularly as "women's intuition" is probably the same phenomenon, an ability to form quick judgments of personalities and predict behavior on the basis of scant evidence, without being able to articulate how one made those judgments and predictions. Because most societies socialize women more than men to be sensitive to the nuances of interpersonal situations, such "knowing" has come to be identified with the female. See Rehm and Gadenne 7.

8. The retrospective accounts of many writers confirm Berne's observation that intuition is prelinguistic; see, for example, John Fowles's discussion of how the idea for *The French Lieutenant's Woman* came to him in an image of a woman in Victorian costume, looking out to sea from a harbor wall. Goldberg maintains that some writers (himself included) have intuitions in linguistic form, when the right word or phrase pops spontaneously into mind (74). My sense is that this "mot juste" phenomenon is postintuitive, the linguistic shaping of intuitive knowledge. It does seem, however,

that the form in which intuition comes—visual or auditory—may be domain-specific. Composers of music, for example, often report that they "hear" their ideas; see the musings of Mozart on the subject (Hadamard 16).

9. Fischbein, speaking of intuition in the sciences and mathematics, puts it another way: "In an intuition one generally grasps the universality of a principle, of a relation, of a law—of an invarient—through a particular reality" (50).

10. Even though it sounds eccentric, Schiller's technique was probably useful in more than just a ritualistic sense. Ackerman reports that researchers at Yale University found that in fact such a smell has a powerful elevating effect and can even stave off panic attacks. Other writers' rituals seem more eccentric than Schiller's. Dame Edith Sitwell would lay in a coffin for awhile before beginning her day's writing. D. H. Lawrence, in typical Lawrentian fashion, would climb naked into mulberry trees to stimulate his creative processes. Benjamin Franklin felt he did his best work when he wrote in the nude, perhaps the reason he invented the Franklin stove (see Ackerman; Wyche-Smith, "Magic"). Students may say that they do not have writing rituals involving the senses, but a recent research project found that over 80 percent of college students surveyed at a large research institution eat when they write (Wyche-Smith, personal communication).

6. Endings: Teacher Affect/Teacher Effect

1. Others who have written about student-teacher relationships have approached affective issues through the lens of psychoanalysis (see, for example, the series in *College English* 49.6–7 [1987]). I find the metaphor of teacher as therapist unwise, perhaps in part because I work with new teachers who sometimes mistake the metaphor for the thing itself.

2. Noddings suggests that empathy is a particularly "feminine" characteristic, one associated with the mother rather than the father (*Caring*). There are a number of theorists who assert that collaboration, cooperation, shared leadership, and the integration of cognitive and affective—characteristics of empathic teachers—are feminist modes of teaching (see Schniedewind; Flynn). I do not disagree, but I also find it useful to think of empathy in terms of "connected knowing" versus "separate knowing" as defined by

Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule. Neither connected knowing nor empathic teaching is exclusively feminist.

3. Here the conflated "I" becomes awkward. Sue Hallet was the teacher of record and Susan McLeod conducted the interview with Melanie.

4. In composition, Bandura's concept of self-efficacy has been applied to student self-evaluation; see McCarthy, Meier, and Rinderer.

5. For a general overview of such concerns, see the Winter 1986 issue of the NEA journal *Thought and Action*, the focus of which is "Affect and Anxiety in the Academy."